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THE INDOCTRINATION OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING INTO THE
FIELD OF ISSUING SECURITIES
By GEORGE B. WHEALEN
Today, there exists two methods by which the issuers of securities, such
as bonds, debentures, and equipment trusts sell their issues. One method is
by private negotiation, the other is by opening the sale of such newly issued
securities to public competitive bidding. In the early history of issuing
securities the predominant method of selling these issues was by private nego-
tiation. This was a satisfactory transfer until out of these private negotiations
there evolved several huge monopolies in the underwriting field. That is,
several investment bankers would handle virtually all of the underwriting
of issues in major industries such as railroads and public utilities. It might
here be explained that to underwrite an issue of securities is to take charge
of the distribution and sale of such securities to the public. The underwriter
guarantees to purchase all of the securities with the expectation of selling
them to private investors. He is the "middle man" in the transferring of
securities from the issuer to the public. Realizing the injury to the public
interest that these monopolies brought about, different legislative bodies and
governmental commissions have enacted and enforced rules requiring com-
petitive bidding in certain types of industries, namely those industries which
greatly affect public interests. As a result, most underwriting of security
issues today is handled by public competitive bidding. As evidence of this
fact, between January, 1941, and January, 1951, out of a total of 803 debt
issues sold during that period, 548 (68 per cent) have been sold com-
petitively.'
The problem of compulsory competitive bidding in different fields
should arouse the general interest for two important reasons. First, stripped
of its formalities, the basic problem presented is, should the government
dictate to a company how and to whom this company should sell its securities.
Or, should we let the company sell securities to whoever it chooses. In other
words, how much control should the government have a right to exert on its
private citizens? It comes down to the right to trade freely versus the degree
of public interest at stake in such sales. Secondly, the amounts involved in
the sale of securities in dollars and cents are huge. Between January, 1941,
and January, 1951, the aggregate amount of debt issues underwritten alone
was valued at 17.8 billion dollars.' That ours is a nation of credit is well
exemplified by that figure since basically all a debt issue represents is a long-
term loan made by its issuer.
1"A Decade of Competitive and Negotiated Debt Financing," Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., p. 1.
2Ibid.
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Thus it appears that the principles of free enterprise, as well as a good
part of our nation's finances, are directly related to the problem of com-
pulsory competitive bidding.
A Brief History of the Growth of Competitive Bidding
As was stated, years ago most sales of securities by the issuer were
carried out through private negotiations with the company and the under-
writer, or private investor. The first evidence of compulsory competitive
bidding by* statute was in Massachusetts in 1870. A state law' was passed
requiring that all stocks of gas and electric companies shall be sold through
competitive bidding, if not taken by shareholders pursuant to their preemptive
rights. In 1918, this requirement was extended to bonds.
4
During the same period the American Company and its predecessor,
the American Bell Telephone Company, on their own volition invited com-
petitive bids for their long-term debts.' Then in 1906 they changed their
policy and entered into private negotiations for such sales. One of the prin-
cipal underwriters was J. P. Morgan & Co.6 which, as will be shown, was
one of the monopolistic underwriters that the government commissions have
aimed to control by their compulsory competitive bidding laws.
In 1918 and again in 1929 the Indiana Public Service Commission
required certain public utility companies to sell their issues of securities at
public auction.7
The problem first attained the serious consideration of a Federal Com-
mission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1924 in the Chicago Union
Station Bond Issue case.' In that case the above mentioned corporation, pur-
suant.to the Interstate Commerce Act, ruling section 20a (2) and (3),'
"Mass. Gen. L. C. 164, sees. 18-19; 5 Ann. L. Mass. C. 164, 18-19.
'Mass. Gen. L. C. 164, see. 15; 5 Ann. L. Mass. C. 164, sec. 15.
5F. C. C. Report of the Investigation of the Telephone Industry in United States, pursuant to
Pub. Res. No. 8, H. R. Doc. No. 340, 74th Cong.; 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 593 (1939).
01bid.
Re Citizens Gas Co., Public Utility Reports, C. 354 (1928).
'Chicago Union Station Co., First Mortgage Bonds Issue for Construction of Passenger Station
at Chicago, Illinois, 86 I. C. C. 529 (1924).
'See. 20a of Interstate Commerce Act: "(2) It shall be unlawful for any carrier to issue any
share of capital stock or any bond or other evidence of interest in or indebtedness of the carrier
... unless and until, and then only to the extent that, upon application by the carrier and after
investigation by the commission of the purpose and uses of the proposed issue and the proceeds
thereof, . . .the commission by order authorizes such issue or assumption. The commission shall
make such order only if it finds that such issue or assumption: (a) is for some lawful object within
the corporate purposes and compatible with public interest, which is necessary or appropriate or
consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier,
and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and
appropriate for such purpose.
"(3) The commission shall have power by its order to grant or deny the application as made
or to grant it in part and deny it in part, or to grant it with such modifications and upon such terms
and conditions as the commission may deem necessary and appropriate in the premises, and may,
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applied for permission to sell an issue of securities which were privately
negotiated to Kuhn Loeb and Company. In an order granting this permission,
the commission stated that it knew of no good reason why applicant in selling
securities should deal with a single financial house. But they allowed the
sale, for they felt that it was set at a fair price, even though made through
private negotiation. Finally, in 1927, this same commission established a
rule requiring all equipment trust issues to be underwritten only after com-
petitive bidding.' ° The commissioners felt that with the great growth of the
security market, the best method of obtaining wide distribution of the issue
would be through competitive bidding. Also, they felt that this method would
do the job cheaper than by private negotiation. The commission based their
authority to enact such a rule under section 20a (2) and (3) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act." The language in these subsections was considered
broad enough to confer such powers on them, i. e., to compel as a general
rule public bidding in any group of issues sold by common carriers.
In 1935, Congress in passing the Public Utility Holding Company Act'"
conferred upon the Securities and Exchange Commission authority over
public utility holding companies similar to the authority the Interstate Com-
merce Commission had over common carriers. In passing the act Congress
directed particular attention to the evils which could result when a special
relationship exists between parties who enter into a transaction in which there
is an absence of arms length bargaining.' 3 The commissioners would care-
fully study the underwriting of issues sold by companies under their control.
They would use their discretion in accepting and rejecting different sales,
always keeping in mind what is best for public interest. But, nevertheless,
these monopolies continued in the underwriting field. In 1938, the S. E. C.
enacted rule U-12F-2."4 It prohibited the paying of underwriters' fees unless
paid to those awarded issues by open competition. An exception to the rule
was that it did not apply to those underwriters awarded 5 per cent or less of
the total offering."5 This exception was the undoing of the spirit of the rule.
from time to time, for good cause shown, make such supplemental orders in the premises as it may
deem necessary or appropriate, and may by particular purposes, uses, and extent to which, or the
conditions under which, any securities so therefore authorized or the proceeds thereof may be
applied, subject always to the requirements of paragraph (2) of this section." 63 Stats. 487 (1949);
49 U. S. C., see. 20a (2) (3) (1950).
"0 In re Western Maryland Equipment Trust, 111 I. C. C. 434 (1927).
"See note 9, supra.
1249 Stats. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C., secs. 79-79z (1950).
"3 Statement of the S. E. C. upon promulgation under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, of rule U-50 requiring competitive bidding of registered public utility holding companies
and their subsidiaries.
'Fed. Register, vol. 3.3 (Dec., 1938).
5 Ibid.
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The monopolistic houses organized bidding groups'" and managed them.
Thus, they could privately negotiate and underwrite a whole issue and after-
wards split it up among the members of the bidding group which they man-
aged (each member receiving less than 5 per cent of the total issue). This
newly developed situation necessitated longer and costlier investigations"7
by the S. E. C. than previous to the enactment of rule U-12F-2. In 1940,
the S. E. C. made an extensive and lengthy investigation into the matter, which
included many public hearings and a linal public conference." Advocates
of both competitive bidding and private negotiation presented their argu-
ments in this conference. From this investigation the commission concluded
that the public interest demanded the adoption of public bidding for all
securities requiring its approval. 9 Accordingly, on April 7, 1941, it adopted
rule U-502" and rescinded rule U-12F-2.2' The rule required competitive
bidding for the sale of securities issued by all companies that came under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, i. e., all registered public
utility holding companies. In the promulgation statement22 the commission
stated that it could control no other companies under this rule.
Meanwhile, during the period of this investigation and legislation by
the S. E. C., other federal control commissions were passing similar acts con-
trolling the issuing of securities of companies under their jurisdiction by
compulsory competitive bidding.2"
By 1943 all of the governmental agencies, with the exception of one,
had enacted similar rules requiring public bidding of issues sold by com-
panies under their jurisdiction. The one exception was the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the same agency that pioneered in compelling competitive
bidding.24 In 1943, the controversy as to whether or not this commission
should compel public bidding for issues sold by railroads grew to one of
major importance. This was evidenced in the Pennsylvania Railroad case.25
This railroad applied to the commission for an order permitting the sale of
"Common term for a number of underwriters joining together for the purpose of bidding as
a body, for a certain issue put up for sale. Each member underwrites a part of the issue.
,Tn Matter of Consumers Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 444, 457 (1939) ; Holding Company Act Release
No. 2654, March 28, 1941.
18A transcript of the conference is available at the S. E. C. office in Washington. It might be
interesting to note that the representation of those active in utility holding company management
was weak. Only two persons with any background in such management appeared at the conference.
One advocated competitive bidding, the other opposed it.
"See note 13, supra.
2017 Code Fed. Reg., sec. 250.50 (1949).
"See note 14, supra.
"See note 13, supra.
"For example, the Federal Power Commission (1939), 2 Fed. Power Comm'n Rep. 350.
"4 See note 8, supra.
"Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. et al., 61 F. Supp. 905 (1945), affirmed 155 F. 2d
522 (1946).
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certain securities to Kuhn Loeb & Company, investment bankers. The sale
was privately negotiated. Permission was granted. In a dissenting opinion,
Commissioner Eastman stated that he felt the underwriters had a monopoly
on handling these issues and that they played the part of "jobbers," distrib-
uting the issues to other investment bankers instead of acting as retailers.
This controversy came to a head and was decided in ex parte 158.26 The
hearing was concluded on May 8, 1944, and out of it came an I. C. C. order27
requiring competitive bidding for all sales of issues by companies (common
carriers) under its control. In the opinion of the hearing the commission
emphasized that there were four main factors that should be kept in mind in
deciding the controversy. How will compulsory competitive bidding affect:
(1) the prices involved in the transaction, (2) distribution of the securities,
(3) the loss of investment banker's advice and services given to the issuing
companies, and (4) the loss of the protection that these investment bankers
would give to these companies?"
More recently, the Railroad Commission of the State of California con-
ducted a hearing on the question of requiring compulsory competitive bidding
by the companies under its control, i. e., public carriers and utilities. They
answered the question in the affirmative and adopted a rule requiring public
bidding.29
At present the question is fairly well settled. Industries which most
affect public interest, such as public utilities, electric companies, and rail-
roads are compelled to offer their newly issued securities for sale by competi-
tive bidding. One major field stands uncontrolled by any government agency
in this respect. This is the field of industrials, including those industries
which produce and process goods as differentiated from those industries
giving a public service. These industries do little or no selling of their
securities by competitive bidding.
Given a brief history of this gradual change over from private negoti-
ating to competitive bidding, for what reasons did these government agencies
enforce such a change? Why did public bidding encounter so much opposi-
tion, both by companies issuing the securities and by many underwriters?
"Ex Parte 158, In re Competitive Bidding in Sale of Securities, 257 I. C. C. 129 (1944).
"7 Ibid.
"See note 26, supra.
-"Before the Railroad Commission of the State of California, Decision No. 38614, June 15, 1946.
It should be noted at this point that there is a close uniformity in the procedure and results attained
by the different commissions (both state and federal) in adopting competitive bidding rules. All of
them are granted authority under similar provisions (such as I. C. A., see. 20a, (2) and (3), note 9,
supra) from similar acts. They use basically the same reasons for the necessity of enacting the
rules. And, finally, the rules adopted by each commission are almost identical. They contain about
the same exceptions. The rule usually specifies that it doesn't affect: (1) Preemptive right of
present security holders; (2) Issues totaling less than one million dollars; (3) Short term securities,
and (4) Securities issued for purpose of reorganization, liquidation, merger, etc.
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Arguments Favoring Competitive Bidding
These governmental agencies were, in most cases, delegated one basic
responsibility. They must control and regulate the management of the com-
panies under their jurisdiction as will best suit the public interest. What
many company managers fail to realize, when arguing against such measures
as compulsory public bidding, is that the regulatory commission is primarily
interested in what will satisfy the public as a whole and not what will best
satisfy the company." What measures would reduce the expense to the
consumer? One thing that obviously would produce this result would be to
cut down the expenses of the company that serves him. The commissioners
had thrust upon them a multitude of statistical evidence conclusively proving
that the issuers of securities would obtain a much higher price for their issues
if they asked for public bids from underwriters. The virtue of this method
of obtaining an underwriter to handle the issue lies in the fact that the
issuer has available to it the highest bid in each instance. This fact was estab-
lished on the evidence that the "spreads" obtained selling competitively were
much lower than those obtained through private negotiation. The "spread"
or gross profit to the underwriters on each issue has been computed as the
difference between the price the underwriter paid the issuer and the initial
offering price to the public, i. e., the price that the underwriter hopes that he
will get for the securities. The offering price of an issue is usually based upon
what the prevailing market price of similar securities is at the time of issuing.
That price would normally be the same regardless of the method used to
bring the issue to the public. So, if it could be shown that the gross profit
of the underwriter decreased after the use of competitive bidding, this would
be strong evidence that the underwriter, receiving less gross profit or spread,
is paying a higher price for the issue than he would have paid under private
negotiation. One of many examples proving that this actually happened may
be found in the following figures: The underwriting "spreads" for utility
debt issues ran from 1.325 per 100 before Rule U-50"1 was passed in April,
1941, compelling competitive bidding, to .43 per 100 in 1950.2 This and
other evidence has aided the commissions in concluding that competitive
bidding has resulted in a lowered cost of raising capital.
Another attribute of public bidding worthy of note is that it affords
the management and directors of the issuing company more protection against
charges by stockholders for injury caused the company by using poor judg-
ment. In private negotiation the management leaves itself open to charges of
"°See note 7, supra.
81See note 20, supra.
"See note 1, supra, at 11.
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negligence in setting the selling price and its terms. In competitive bidding
management is assured of getting the best price if it accepts the highest bid."3
Another benefit brought about by competitive bidding is that it simplifies
the commission's job in deciding what is a fair price for each sale of an issue.
This fact has been greatly disputed. But one must appreciate the extensive
investigations a commission had to make into the suitability of the selling
price of privately negotiated issues before it could allow the sale to be
effective. A price set by fair competitive bidding should be representative of
the best price that a company could get for the securities it issues.
Arguments Against Private Negotiation
Is the fact that there are obvious benefits to competitive bidding as a
method in obtaining an underwriter to handle the issued securities the only
reason that the railroads, utilities, and other companies are ordered not to
privately negotiate with underwriters? No. Conversely, there is the added
reason that the lawmakers and commissioners feel that private negotiation is
injurious to the public interest.
Through years of private negotiating, different companies become accus-
tomed to dealing with the same writers exclusively. In itself this is not an
evil, for the basic capitalistic principle is that every man should have the
right to deal with whom he pleases. But out of continued dealing with the
same underwriters there evolved an evil that had to be destroyed in companies
that directly served the public. This evil could be best described as appearing
in the form of a monopoly in the underwriting field. For example, two under-
writing firms, 4 and their affiliates were the only underwriters for virtually
all of the railroads in the nation. These railroads failed or refused to investi-
gate the possibilities of other avenues of financing. These underwriters could
effectively name their price. At least they had no fear of losing their account
to another company because of the offer of a higher price. And until the
I. C. C. finally made an absolute requirement for competitive bidding, even
the courts tolerated these policies. It was stated "the manner in which the
defendant corporation floated the bond issue has been in use almost since
'Iron Horse Days'-it is apparently a matter of corporate policy pursued
by the railroads generally."35 But ironically enough this was used as a reason
for allowing such monopoly to continue. To make matters worse, these under-
writers had close connections with certain directors in some of the railroads.
These connections made it difficult at best for underwriters to deal at arms
"3But see Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. et al., 61 F. Supp. 905, 910 (1945).
"4The two firms were Morgan Stanley & Co., and Kuhn Loeb & Co. Ex Parte 158, In re Com-
petitive Bidding in Sale of Securities, 257 I. C. C. 129 (1944).
" See note 25, supra.
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length when negotiating to handle issues. In the statement by the S. E. C. upon
promulgation of rule U-50 6 the commission emphasized another form of
underwriting monopoly which was obtaining the same injurious result as the
above mentioned monopoly. This monopoly was found in the public utility
holding companies. It has been developed to where control is exercised
through a maze of intercorporate relationships impossible to be understood
by the ordinary man." It is enough to say, for the purposes of this comment,
that through this maze of intercorporate relationships the controlling interest
of a corporation may be vested in one who owns a fraction of a percent of
the corporation's stock. Unfortunately this control often vested in the same
underwriters who privately negotiated with that corporation. The unhealthi-
ness of this situation is clear. But whether or not the investment banker
controlled the corporation he was dealing with, the facts proved that these
public utilities continually negotiated with these same underwriters." Not
only has this resulted in a failure to seek the views of anyone other than the
customary writer, it has also resulted in an undue acquiescence by the man-
agers of the utility companies in the views of the underwriter.3 "
Arguments Against Competitive Bidding With Rebuttals
The arguments raised in opposition to the adoption of rules which
compel competitive bidding are many. Most of these arguments have been
presented time and again before federal commissions and other governmental
agencies which consider the question, what limitations to put on the issuing
of securities. One argument strongly relied upon by those advocating private
negotiations is that forcing the issuers to offer securities to open bidding is
imposing upon them an unnecessary restraint of free enterprise. They argued
that the managers of these companies should have the freedom to deal as
thy think best and use competitive bidding only when they deem it necessary.
Commissioner Healy of the S. E. C. best answered this argument as follows:
"Ours is a system of free enterprise. And, when practices are allowed
to develop which eliminate or suppress competition, the very fundamentals
of that system are endangered. The liberating influence of our competitive
bidding rule (U-50) will foster free enterprise and competitive bidding in
a field which has long been characterized by concentration of the manage-
ment and underwriting of new securities in the hands of fewer firms." 40
Another point emphasized in opposition to competitive bidding is that
it will lead to overpricing of the offering or market price of the issues. That
"See note 13, supra.
"Spoken by Sam Rayburn, 79 Cong. Rec. 10318.
"See note 13, supra.
::See note 13, supra.
"Spoken in an address on August 28, 1941, before the National Association of Railroad and
Utilities Commissioners.
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is, granted that the issuer may get a higher price by the underwriters who
handle his securities, this price will force a resulting higher price at which
the securities will be offered to the public. They claim that many evils will
arise because of this; evils such as sluggish or delayed distribution, high
pressure salesmanship, sale of securities to investors above the fair market
price, and as a result, many dissatisfied investors. All of this will injure the
credit and reputation of the company and the securities issued by it.4 And
also, if the underwriter is awarded the issue because of an outrageously high
bid he may be stuck with a "sticky issue," one which he could only sell to
the public with little or no profit. In answer, overpricing and underpricing
of the offering price has occurred under both systems of selling securities
and will continue so long as values are not susceptible of absolute determina-
tion.42 There are other factors which enter into the determination of the
offering price, for example, the solvency of the issuing corporation and the
terms of the issue.43 Even if the above claim of the adversaries to competitive
bidding were well founded, if such overbidding resulted in great hardship
and little profit to the underwriter, these self-inflicted penalties would curb
these tendencies. Overbidding is self-correcting.
Competitive bidding will deprive the issuer of financial aid in times of
stress and advice of by one who understands that company's financial struc-
ture best, since it will break up the special relationship between the company
and that investment banker with whom he has dealt with in the past. In
answer to the former purported loss, deprivation of financial aid, the question
has been asked, if such benefit ever existed, why then, did many of the rail-
roads have to turn to the R. F. C. for financial help during the depression? 4
Why couldn't the investment bankers, who had their accounts with the rail-
roads, have given sufficient aid? Obviously, this is asking too much of these
underwriters, but it is evidence to prove the point that in times of stress the
close relationship has not been shown to be very advantageous. As for the
latter purported loss, expert financial advice, there are admittedly some good
grounds for the companies wanting such advice from those with whom it
deals in putting out issues of securities. In the opinion of the Chicago Union
Station Bond Issue case (1924)" 5 the commissioners stated, "The railroads
want advice with intimate knowledge of their affairs-a knowledge that can
"1 See note 26, supra.
"21bid.
"See note 29, supra.
"During the 8-month period from the organization of the R. F. C. of February 2, 1932, to
September 30, 1932, the corporation authorized loans to 53 railroads totaling $264,366,933 (including
$16,529,586 to seven railroad receivers.) The World Almanac for 1933, published by New York
World Telegram, p. 153.
"5See note 8, supra.
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only be gained by regular banking relations." One thing that those who
present this argument have neglected to mention is that there is a good
possibility that such advice coming from the investment banker who will
handle the underwriting may be conditioned more by the prospect of such
banker's profits than by the issuer's needs and interests.
Another claim made in opposition to competitive bidding is that the
small underwriter will be injured by it. A valid rebuttal for this argument
is that if the big investment bankers had any intention of cutting out the
smaller man they would have done so long before this controversy arose.
A big argument put forth by those advocating private negotiations was
that if the issuer had to depend upon public competitive bidding in order
to find an underwriter, he could easily be dissatisfied with the results. One
case that has been referred to is the Chicago Union- Station Bond Issue of
1940."6 In that case the applicant was ordered to put its issues up to com-
petitive bidding. It did so and only received one bid. It rejected this bid as
being too low and privately negotiated the issue and received a higher price.
This is an example of what might occasionally happen as the result of putting
issues up to competitive bidding. But in the last decade this type of thing
has been the rare exception (found in less than 1 per cent of sales made)
and not the trend. As for the issuer having to accept an irresponsible bidder
because his bid was highest, the following claim is made by Halsey Stuart
& Co., investment bankers:
"Another line of argument opposing competitive bidding was that this
method of sale would lead to irresponsible bidding. The ten year record fails
to disclose rejection of any bids on such grounds. We know of no instance
in which bidders after being awarded an issue, have failed to honor such
commitment by making payment and accepting delivery." 47
These and other less important arguments represent the basis of the
case against competitive bidding. Some were proven to be completely
unfounded, others to show merit. But the commissioners, looking at their
arguments as a whole, decided that they were not strong enough to defeat the
value of competitive bidding.
Conclusion: The Possibility of Extending Compulsory
Competitive Bidding to Other Fields
It is not likely that compulsory competitive bidding will be extended
to any new field of industry in the near future. As stated before, industrials
are about the only major field unaffected by such requirements. Companies
in this field which are vested with a public interest because of public owner-
"Chicago Union Station Co. Securities (1940), 239 I. C. C. 325.
"'See note 1, supra, at 22.
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ship of their securities or because of the public nature of the services which
they render should consider the benefits of public bidding. Most of the argu-
ments favoring this method of handling securities that have been presented
in this comment apply to many of the big industrial companies. But few of
them have departed from their customary procedure of privately negotiating
for underwriting services. Doubtless, there are many good reasons why these
companies continue to follow this policy. For instance, a young and rapidly
expanding corporation could have been financed through the diligence of
one investment banker. He is a big factor in the success of that corporation's
stable financial structure. There is no reason why the managers of this
corporation should turn away from such a valuable service. But, on the other
hand, there are just as likely to be situations similar to those underwriting
monopolies which do more harm than good to public interest.
Whether or not there should be compulsory competitive bidding is not
so much a question of its merit as it is of enforcement. At present there is
no governmental commission that could enact and enforce a competitive
bidding rule in the field of industrials.4" But the Department of Justice has
recently attempted to remedy the alleged underwriting monopoly in all fields
generally. It instigated a suit,"9 in progress at this writing, against 17 invest-
ment banking houses and the Investment Bankers' Association for violation
of sections (1) and (2) of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." The government
"alleges a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize the securities business of
the United States by restricting, controlling, and fixing the channels and
methods, the prices, terms and conditions upon which security issues are
merchandised."'" The claim is that the defendants have formed a "syndicate"
whereby they refuse to compete against each other in the merchandising of
issues. Instead, one or two of the defendant companies will manage the
underwriting of an issue, and, for a manager's fee (usually a percentage of
the gross "spread"), will share the issue with the other defendant companies.
As a result the issuers are allegedly coerced into dealing with the managing
company at its price since other defendants, composed of the biggest invest-
ment bankers in the field, refuse to negotiate or offer a bid with such issuer.
"sIt has been suggested that the states individually might order competitive bidding as a require-
ment for incorporation in a state that has no such preincorporation requirement.
"United States v. H. S. Morgan et al., doing business as Morgan Stanley & Co. Civil 43-757.
See ante, note 51.
"0 The text of the act may be found in 15 U. S. C. A., secs. 1-7 (1951) : "The purpose of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act is the preservation of a system of free competitive enterprise and the
protection of the public against the evils incident to the monopolies and contracts or combinations
tending directly toward unreasonable suppression or restraints of interstate trade or commerce."
(58 C. J. S. 972.) "The act should be liberally construed having in mind its benefit and purposes
for the public good." (United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (1945).)
""The Federal Anti-Trust Laws," Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (Based on material compiled
in the Anti-Trust Division of the United States Department of Justice, Jan. 15, 1949.)
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This governmental attack is a novel approach to the problem in two
respects. First, the problem formerly had been remedied by controls on the
issuer, not the underwriter. Secondly, there had been no necessity to apply
anti-trust law previously. But even though the approach used in this suit is
fundamentally different, the end that it seeks is basically the same, i. e., to
break up underwriting monopolies.
The Department of Justice, in this suit, prays that, among other things,
each defendant be enjoined (1) from occupying a dual function of advisor
to and underwriter for the same issuer; (2) from interfering with the rights
of issuers and investors in freely choosing their methods, and (3) from
participating in buying groups to merchandise any securities in which another
defendant is a participant.
It is difficult to predict what will result from this suit. The remedy
sought is injunctive in nature. As mentioned, there are at present no govern-
mental agencies which have the power to control either underwriters or
industrial companies directly in matters concerning the method of sale of
securities. If the court in this case gives injunctive relief, ostensibly the
only method of enforcement would be to hold defendants in contempt of
court for any future violation of such injunctive order. Practically speaking,
such a result would put a great burden on the court, a duty to scrutinize closely
every transaction made by each of the defendants.
Perhaps the government hopes to place this job of enforcement in the
hands of another governmental agency, which could possibly, in time, compel
competitive bidding. The Department of Justice in its complaint informed the
court that competitive bidding affects the "syndicate" because of "a substan-
tially narrower spread (obtained by competitive bidding) than the spread
they get through their negotiated sale transaction, and the management fee
of the 'syndicate' manager is similarly lowered or eliminated."
This case represents the latest approach to the problem. It may lead to
the extension of compulsory competitive bidding or some other method of
regulatory control for the purpose of eliminating remaining underwriting
monopolies which have proven harmful to public interest.
